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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for
post-conviction relief.
In short, this case concerned a forcible stranger rape. An extreme closeup video of sexual intercourse was found on the defendant’s phone. At trial, the
victim's gynecologist testified that the victim was the female in the video based
upon various physical characteristics of her pubic area.
Petitioner
appellate counsel

made various claims of ineffective assistance of trial and
concerning the failure to properly object to this crucial

testimony or pursue it on appeal.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Supreme Court described the underlying criminal case in its published
opinion in the direct appeal in State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299 (2014):
In the predawn hours of August 27, 2009, a woman sleeping in the
bedroom of her apartment in Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho,
awakened to see an unknown male standing over her with a knife
in his hand. He was wearing a mask that covered his face and
exposed his eyes. He put a hand over her mouth and held a knife
against her throat, and he then stated that she was going to
cooperate. He initially attempted several sexual acts, but was
unable to obtain an erection. He then had her lie on her back at the
bottom of the bed, where he raped her. He wore a condom and
used his cell phone to take photos of her during the rape. Before
leaving, he took her sheets and a pillow case. He also had her
remove the battery from her cell phone, and he placed it under
clothing in her panty drawer. She ran to a neighbor's house, where
she called 911. Defendant was immediately the focus of law
enforcement.
The Nampa police had been investigating Michael Russo
(Defendant) for an assault and battery that had occurred in Nampa
1

on August 21, 2008. The victim, a young woman, and a female
friend were alone on the second floor of the friend's home when a
male appeared in the doorway of the room they were in. He was
wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt, black hat, and blue jeans, and
he stated that there was a fire in the basement. The victim noticed
that he was wearing blue latex gloves. She ran downstairs and
looked into the basement, but did not see any indication of a fire,
and the man followed her down the stairs. She told him that there
was no fire, and he responded that two children had run down into
the basement. She walked down into the basement to check, and
the man followed her. Once they were in the basement, the man
lunged at her and attempted to strangle her. In the ensuing
struggle, he pushed her down onto a sofa, put his hand across her
mouth, and told her he had a knife. She began screaming and
kicked him in the stomach, and he fled. The victim and her friend
ran after him, and the friend noticed that there was a black
motorcycle in the area. They then called the police.
An officer stopped a man who matched the description of the
assailant about two blocks from the crime scene, and the man
identified himself as Michael Russo, but claimed to have no
identification. He had fresh blood on the right side of his face and
neck, which he asserted to be the result of a shaving accident. He
said that he was there because his motorcycle had broken. The
officer asked Defendant to empty his pockets, and when he
complied he produced identification. Two men then drove up and
stated that they had seen someone running, but Russo was not that
person. Defendant was acting nervously and volunteered that he
had been involved in a robbery where a rape occurred in 1995. In
actuality, Defendant had been convicted of rape in Washington in
1995 and was a registered sex offender.
The following day, Corporal Angela Weekes of the Nampa Police
Department interviewed Defendant. During the interview, he denied
involvement in the assault and battery, but he consented to a
search of his computer. The computer contained several videos of
women being violently raped, and some of the search criteria in the
computer included rape fantasies. Defendant stated that prior to
raping the woman in Washington, he had watched pornography
that contained women being raped. He also said that he fantasized
about raping a girl who would get turned on during the rape and
decide she liked it; that he fantasized about being dominant over
someone; and that he still struggled with issues involving
aggression and sexual boundaries.
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After the Nampa police responded to the victim's apartment in this
case and spoke with the victim, Defendant became the focus of
their investigation. They contacted the Meridian police, who sent an
officer to Defendant's apartment in Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
When the officer arrived there at 5:47 a.m., the lights were on in the
apartment. He confirmed that Defendant was inside the apartment,
and he checked Defendant's motorcycle that was parked outside
and determined that the engine was still warm. The Meridian officer
stayed outside Defendant's apartment for about an hour and left
when he was relieved by Detective Deborah Cain of the Nampa
Police Department. Another Nampa officer later arrived at about
8:30 a.m., and they both kept the apartment under surveillance.
Corporal Weekes contacted Detective Ray Ellis of the Meridian
Police Department and asked him to obtain a search warrant from a
judge in Ada County, and he did. In his affidavit, Detective Ellis
provided the information described above; information concerning
the rape of a young woman working as a barista in Fruitland, Idaho,
on July 8, 2009, and Defendant's conduct at that coffee shop the
day and evening before the rape; and information concerning
Defendant's 1995 rape of a young woman working as a barista at a
coffee shop in Washington. On August 27, 2009, at 11:10 a.m., the
magistrate judge issued a search warrant authorizing the police to
search Defendant's residence and motorcycle and to seize, as
evidence of the crime of rape, certain described items that may be
located in those places, including a cellular phone. As soon as
Detective Ellis had obtained the search warrant, he informed
Corporal Weekes that the warrant had been issued, and he then
proceeded to Defendant's apartment with the warrant. Corporal
Weekes and two other Nampa detectives then headed to
Defendant's apartment.
At about 11:50 a.m., Detective Cain saw Defendant leave his
apartment and walk to his mailbox. She called Corporal Weekes,
and then she and the other Nampa officer detained Defendant at
his mailbox. Corporal Weekes performed a patdown search of
Defendant and removed his wallet and a cell phone from his
pockets. She told him that he was not being arrested but was being
detained for investigation, and she handcuffed him and placed him
in a patrol car. About five minutes later, Detective Brice King of the
Nampa Police Department arrived, and Corporal Weekes gave him
the cell phone. He looked through what was stored on the phone
and saw a video of a condom-covered penis penetrating a shaved
vagina. He then turned the phone off.
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The officers searched Defendant's apartment pursuant to the
warrant, and they found, among other items of evidence, two cell
phones. Later that afternoon, Detective Ellis went back to the
magistrate court to obtain an amended search warrant for the
search of the two cell phones found in Defendant's apartment and
the cell phone taken from his person. He presented to the court an
amended affidavit, which included all of the information contained in
the initial affidavit and additional information, including the
statement: "Additionally, a cellular phone was recovered from Mr.
Russo's person during a pat down search for officer safety. This
phone was opened and looked at to determine ownership. Your
affiant knows that a video was located on that phone that appears
to depict the victim from this morning's rape." Based upon the
amended affidavit, the magistrate judge issued a search warrant on
August 27, 2009, at 3:15 p.m. authorizing the search of the three
cell phones.
Id., p. 302-303.
The Supreme Court explained the procedure of the criminal case as
follows:
Defendant was indicted for the rape. Prior to his trial, he moved to
suppress various items of evidence including the video found on
the cell phone that was on his person. The district court denied his
motion to suppress. During the subsequent jury trial, the victim's
gynecologist testified that the victim was the woman in the video
based upon various physical characteristics of her vaginal area.
Prior to trial, the State also gave notice that it intended to offer
evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) of various prior bad
acts of Defendant. The district court refused to permit most of the
proffered evidence to be admitted, but it held, over objection, that
the State could present evidence of Defendant's rape fantasies and
of pornography found in his possession that depicted rape.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of the
felony crimes of Rape, of Kidnapping in the First Degree
(kidnapping for the purpose of raping the person kidnapped), and of
Burglary. For the crime of Rape, the district court sentenced
Defendant to fixed life in the custody of the Idaho Board of
Correction without the possibility of parole. For the crime of
Kidnapping in the First Degree, the court sentenced him to life in
the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with the first forty
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years of that sentence fixed. For the crime of Burglary, the court
sentenced him to a fixed ten years in the custody of the Idaho
Board of Correction. The latter two sentences were ordered to run
concurrently with the fixed life sentence for Rape.
Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to
suppress and the admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence. The
appeal was first heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which
affirmed Defendant's convictions. He then filed a petition for review
with this Court, which we granted. . . . We likewise affirm
Defendant's convictions.
Id., p. 303-304.
Mr. Russo then timely filed a pro se form verified petition for postconviction relief along with a sworn statement of facts. (R. p. 4-15, 16-21.) The
court granted his request that counsel be appointed. (R. p. 63-66, 73-74.)
The state filed an answer and a Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R. p. 8689, 90-104.) The state attached various items from the underlying criminal case
as exhibits, including the trial transcript, which are also exhibits on appeal. (R. p.
87-88.)
A hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal was held. (R. p.
139.) The court took the matter under advisement. (R. p. 139.)
Later, the court issued its Order Granting State’s Motion For Summary
Dismissal and Dismissing Petition (hereinafter Order). (R. p.

139-162.)

A

separate judgment was entered. (R. p. 172-173.)
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which the court denied.
(R. p. 174-181, 194-202.)
Petitioner timely appeals. (R. p. 186-189.)

5

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing
the petition for post-conviction relief

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing the Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal
An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is

civil in nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action
which led to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994). In
order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which the request for postconviction relief is based. Id.
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho
759 (Ct.App. 1991).

Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed

true for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be
held. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994).

If the allegations do not

frame a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily
dismiss, but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly
granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to
petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief.
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995).
7

B.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).

The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result." Id. at 686.
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in
order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau,
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).
C.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Appellate Counsel
The standards regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were

detailed in Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct.App. 2007):
Mintun's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because appointed counsel should have raised certain
additional issues on appeal are subject to the standards set forth in
Strickland, and Mintun therefore must show that appellate counsel's
performance was deficient and caused prejudice in the outcome of
the appeal. An indigent defendant does not have a constitutional
right to compel appointed appellate counsel to press all
nonfrivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to pursue.
Rather, the process of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal
and focusing on those more likely to prevail, far from being the
8

evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate
advocacy. “Notwithstanding Barnes, it is still possible to bring a
Strickland claim based on counsel's failure to raise a particular
claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was
incompetent.” “[O]nly when ignored issues are clearly stronger than
those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of
counsel be overcome.”
Id., 168 P.3d at p. 45 (internal citations omitted).
D.

The Claims and the Court’s Rulings
As characterized by the district court in its Order, Mr. Russo’s claims for

relief were as follows:
1.
Prosecutorial misconduct for failing to disclose the criminal
history of two witnesses: the victim and Kevin Gutierrez;
2.

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for:
a.
Failing to present evidence in the suppression motion;
b.
Failing to object or point out inconsistencies in
cellphone evidence;
c.
Failing to question whether the entire contents of the
cellphone were disclosed;
d.
Failing to get cellphone contents independently
verified;
e.
Failing to file a motion to dismiss;
f.
Failing to impeach Brice King and J.W.;
g.
Failing to address officers’ observations of cellphone
contents;
h.
Failing to try to compel the State to produce the
cellphone or its contents;
i.
Failing to move to suppress expert testimony;
j.
Failing to object to expert testimony;
k.
Failing to adequately examine and present forensic
evidence;

3.

Ineffective assistance of Rule 35 counsel; and

4.

Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Order, p. 2. (R. p. 140.)
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Petitioner is not pursuing all of these claims in this appeal. Instead, this
brief is limited to the issues surrounding the identification of the victim as the
female in Petitioner’s cell phone video. This problem actually weaves itself into
several of the grounds of post-conviction relief.
In his pro se verified petition, Petitioner first raised the issue as ineffective
assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object pre-trial or suppress
testimony of the victim’s OB/GYN when she testified as an expert (as opposed to
fact witness): The petition alleged as follows:
14. The Petitioner alleges that his Trial Counsel’s failure to
suppress testimony from the State’s shoeprint analyst witness and
OB-GYN witness violated the Petitioner’s rights under Article 1
section 13, Idaho Constitution, and Amendment 6, U.S.
Constitution.
a. Prior to trial, the Prosecution made it clear it intended to
present expert opinion testimony from a shoeprint analyst
and an OB-GYN Physician (see, generally, Tr., 5/11/10).
b. Based on the Court’s May 13, 2010 determinations,
seemingly defining the OB-GYN Physician as a factual
witness rather than an expert opinion witness, and
indicating that the shoeprint analyst’s findings were nonincriminating (Tr., 5/13/10, p16L22-p19 L 12), the
Petitioner’s Trial Counsel should have filed preemptive
objections to the Prosecution presenting opinion
testimony from either of these witnesses.
c. Had the Petitioner’s Trial Counsel properly objected, prior
to trial, the Prosecution would not have been able to
present what ultimately turned out to be its most crucial
testimony. Without such testimony, the Petitioner would
not have been convicted.
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 6. (R. p. 9.)
Next, the petition raised the issue as ineffective assistance of trial counsel
from counsel’s failure to move to dismiss or acquittal based on an insufficient
10

identification that the victim was the female on the cellphone video. The petition
alleged as follows:
17. The Petitioner alleges that his Trial Counsel’s failure to file a
motion for dismissal or acquittal violated the Petitioner’s rights
under Article 1 section 13, Idaho Constitution, and Amendment 6,
U.S. Constitution.
a. Generally, at trial, the Prosecution submitted approximately 6
allegations to support its charges (see Aff.Facts, p4 para.24).
The Prosecution’s primary allegation was its claim that a video
on a cellphone belonging to the Petitioner showed the Petitioner
raping J.W.
b. The Prosecution did not produce sufficient evidence to support
its charges. In particular, the Prosecution failed to produce a
proper identification to support its allegation that J.W. was the
female on the cellphone video (see Aff.Facts, p4, paras. 25-27).
c. The Prosecution’s repeated references and inferences to facts
outside the proper consideration of the jury (see Aff.Facts, pp45 para28), overly increased the inherent prejudicial effect of the
Prosecution’s presentation.
d. Had the Petitioner’s Trial Counsel filed a motion for dismissal, or
acquittal, addressing the insufficiency of the evidence as well as
the probability that prejudice could play an unfair role in the
jury’s determination, there is a likelihood that the motion(s)
would have been successful.
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 8 (emphasis in the original). (R. p. 11.)
Finally, the petition alleged ineffective assistance of direct appellate
counsel for failing to appeal the district court’s denial of trial counsel’s mid-trial
objection to the expert testimony of the OB-GYN:
19. The Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief in this Count Ten of
this matter based on ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel.
Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that his rights under Article 1,
section 13, Idaho Constitution, and Amendment 6, U.S. Constitution
were violated when his counsel on direct appeal, Eric Lehtinen,
omitted a meritorious claim from the BRIEF OF APPELLANT.
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a. At trial, the final witness to testify during the Prosecution’s
presentation was the OB-GYN Physician, Dr. Lisa Minge.
b. Most of Dr. Minge’s testimony remained within the confines of
factual-based observations (Tr., 8/4/10, p76L10-p91L2, p94 Ls1623).
c. Although the Petitioner’s Trial Counsel failed to make a
preemptive objection, once the Prosecutor elicited a response from
Dr. Minge that fell outside the scope of factual-based observations
and into the realm of opinion testimony, the Petitioner’s Trial
Counsel immediately objected, stating, in part, that the witness was
not qualified to make such opinion testimony (Tr., 8/4/10, p92 L21 - p93 L23).
d. A ruling by the District Court on May 13, 2010, denying indigent
funds for the defense to obtain a rebuttal witness to Dr. Minge’s
conclusions, narrowed the scope of Dr. Minge’s testimony to
factual-based observations, effectually disqualifying her from
testifying in the guise of expert opinion
e. The Petitioner’s Appellate Counsel did not appeal the District
Court’s decision to overrule the above-stated objection to the
opinion segment of Dr. minge’s [sic] testimony.
f. The opinion portion of Dr. Minge’s testimony, voicing the
Prosecution’s theory regarding the identity of the female on the
video on the Petitioner’s cellphone, was absolutely crucial to the
Prosecution’s case. A sustained objection to that opinion portion of
Dr. Minge’s testimony would have altered the outcome of the trial in
favor [of] the Petitioner.
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 9-10. (R. p. 12-13.)
The district court of course rejected all of these grounds in its

Order

granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal. The first time the court
discusses it is as follows:
Petitioner also alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to dismiss based upon the insufficiency of the evidence,
specifically that there was not a proper identification to support its
allegation that J.W. was the female on the video, and failed to
argue the probability that prejudice would play an unfair role in the
jury’s determination. As the face of the female on the video is never
shown, it was necessary for the state to establish that it was, in
fact, J.W.
J.W. testified that the perpetrator had a cellphone, and she heard it
and saw the light, and presumed he was taking pictures. Tr. August
12

2, 2010, p. 214-215. She also identified herself in the video. Tr. p.
225-226. Dr. Lisa Minge, J.W.’s OBGYN, also testified that the
female in the video was J.W., noting an uncommon combination of
her distinctive prepuce, crease, c-section scars, and the lack of
pubic hair. Tr. August 4, 2010, p. 86-94. The Court finds that this
evidence was sufficient to rationally infer the identity of J.W. as the
female in the video. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of this
evidence would therefore have been unsuccessful.
Order, p. 14. (R. p. 152.)
The district court went on to discuss the prejudice from this evidence,
noting that I.R.E. 403 only requires the exclusion of evidence that is unfairly
prejudicial such that it tends to suggest a decision on an improper basis.
. . . The Court does not disagree that the identification of the female
in the video as J.W. was prejudicial to the Petitioner: however,
there is nothing about that evidence which tended to suggest a
decision on an improper basis. As such, this argument would not
have warranted either suppression of the identification or dismissal.
Order, p. 15. (R. p. 153.)
The district court then discusses Claims 2(i) and 2(j) which concern failing
to move to suppress or object to expert testimony.
Petitioner claims that counsel should have filed a motion to exclude
the testimony of Dr. Minge, J.W.’s OBGYN and Donna Meade, the
shoe print analyst, but he has failed to allege what the basis of such
motion should have been. With no allegation of facts or other
admissible evidence to provide a basis for excluding the testimony
of these witnesses, the Court cannot find that such motions would
have been successful or that there was a sufficient basis for a
successful objection thereto.
Order, p. 20. (R. p. 158.)
Finally, the district court discussed Claim 4 regarding ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel:
Lastly, Petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to appeal the district court’s decision overruling defense
13

counsel’s objection and allowing Dr. Minge to testify as an expert
as to the identification of the female on the video as J.W. The
failure to raise this issue on appeal does not necessarily result in a
finding of deficient performance. . . .
.
.
.
Petitioner has failed to set forth any cogent reason why this issue
was stronger tha[n] those his counsel did assert. Without such a
showing, Petitioner has not established appellate counsel was
ineffective.
Order, p. 22. (R. p. 160.)
E.

The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the Petition
Petitioner asserts that the district court erred in summarily dismissing the

above referred claims from the petition. In short, the district court fails to
understand or adequately address the issues.
The first step in understanding what really happened is the district court’s
pre-trial comments on whether the victim’s OB-GYN was a fact or an expert
witness.

In a pre-trial hearing on May 11, 2010, the prosecutor advised the

court that based on listening to Petitioner’s jail phone conversations they were
made aware that based on her physical characteristics, he was disputing that the
victim was the same female that appeared in the cell phone video. (Tr.
5/11/2010, p. 32-33.) Thus the prosecution was trying to identify if it was the
same female in the video and the photograph of the victim. (Tr. 5/11/2010, p. 3233.) The prosecutor continued:
So we went and spoke with the victim’s OB-GYN, and she has
conveyed to us that she feels that beyond a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that that is the victim.
THE COURT: And she’s examined it and then—

14

[THE PROSECUTOR]: She’s examined the video as well as the
photographs. And the victim is her patient as well, so.
THE COURT: Okay. So I don’t—she’s going to be a fact witness.
But I guess if she’s being asked to express an opinion, she’s also
then an expert, but also a fact witness. Primarily a fact. Treating
physician.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yeah. That’s correct. And she’ll be talking
about the female genitalia and what the different parts are.
Tr. 5/11/2010, p. 33, ln. 22—p. 34, ln. 11.
Two days later at another pre-trial hearing, the court took up the matter of
expert witnesses for the defense. As a bit of background, while the defendant’s
trial counsel was retained there was no money for expert witnesses to rebut state
witnesses. Assuming an affidavit of indigence was filed, the court acknowledged
that the court would appoint necessary expert witnesses for the defense. (Tr.
5/11/2010, p. 38-39.)
Regarding an OB-GYN expert for the defense, the court stated:
The second thing is it’s my understanding that the–and the State
may be calling the victim’s OBGYN to testify about identifying her
as the—one of the people in the photos or the video on the phone,
the cell phone. I think that’s largely a fact witness. I’m not sure if
you’re going to have an opinion from the person, or if they’re just
going to say, look, I’m—this is—I’m the doctor, and I’m familiar with
the person, and I do these examinations, and that -- but if there’s
an opinion, it’s based on their factual person. So I’m not saying I’m
going to appoint a physician for the defense. There needs to be a
showing that that is necessary.
Tr. 5/13/2010, p. 18, ln. 14—p. 19, ln. 2.
Then, at trial, the relevant testimony of the OB-GYN was as follows:
Q. And Doctor, after your review of the photographs in relationship
to the video and those still photos, can you make determination
beyond a degree of medical certainty whose pelvic region the
female’s in that video is?
15

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I object to the question.
THE COURT: Pardon me?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object.
THE COURT: Anything else besides your objection?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, yes, Your Honor. If I could ask a
couple of questions in aid of objection.
QUESTIONS IN AID OF OBJECTION
BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
Q. Dr. Minge, do you have any particular expertise, schooling in
identifying two females from photographs from just photos of their
genital region, the pelvic region?
A. Other than my years of experience, you mean?
Q. Correct.
A. No.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Your Honor, I object. I don’t think
she’s qualified to make this opinion testimony.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I’ll overrule the objection and
allow the witness to answer.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED)
BY [PROSECUTOR]:
Q. Doctor, I’ll rephrase the question—or not rephrase, but ask it
again, is can you determine beyond a degree of medical certainty
of who’s pelvic area, the female pelvic area is in that video?
A. I believe it’s [J.W.].
[PROSECUTOR]: Thank you, Doctor. No further questions.
THE COURT: You may cross-examine.
BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

16

Q. Did you—were you able to see a belly ring in that video?
A. Not clearly enough to state it.
Q. Could you see a tattoo in the video?
A. Not clearly enough to state it.
Q. Could you see a mole in the video?
A. No.
Q. And you’ve been a patient of hers for a year and a half—or she’s
been a patient of yours for a year and a half?
A. Right.
Q. Thank you. Okay.
How common is it for women of younger age, her age, to have no
pubic hair?
A. It’s common for some part of the genitalia to be shaved or
waxed. It is less common to be completely 100 percent without hair.
But it is more common now than it used to be. I can’t give you an
actual percentage.
Q. Okay. But you would imagine there’s a fairly good population in
this area?
A. Absolutely.
.

.

.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. Doctor, is it uncommon for—let me rephrase that.
How common is it for somebody to have the entire pubic area
shaved, having the two C-section scars and that elongated clitoris?
A. Not very common at all.
Tr. Jury Trial, 8/4/2010, p. 92, ln. 21—p. 96, ln. 1.
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So what happened is the court described the OB-GYN as a fact witness,
basically the victim’s treating physician, and indicated it would not appoint a
defense expert unless and until there was a showing of need.
At trial, however, the OB-GYN, moved from testifying regarding her
patient, and instead testified as an expert in the area of female genitalia
identification and so was able to opine unchallenged on the frequency of various
physical characteristics in the population and thus opined that it was in fact the
victim in the cellphone video.
This constitutes the several different types of ineffective assistance of
counsel claimed by Petitioner. First, given the district court’s varying comments
about whether the OB-GYN physician would be a fact or an expert witness,
defense counsel should have brought a motion in limine.
While inartfully described as a motion to suppress by the pro se
Petitioner, the motion would have requested to exclude expert opinions by the
doctor since the prosecution failed to establish that the identification of specific
female genitalia is an even a proper subject matter for expert testimony and that
this doctor, regardless of her medical experience, was an expert

in said

identification. There was no showing that the anecdotal evidence relied on by
the doctor for her identification is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field of identifying female genitalia. The doctor did not testify about
the existence of, nor is Appellate aware of, any data bases containing data of the
incidence of complete absence in public hair in females of the victim’s age.
Rather, the doctor merely testified it was more common than it used to be. The
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same is true for the other supposedly identifying features such as C-section
scars and the victim’s type of prepuce. In short, the doctor testified in vague
generalities like common or uncommon.
Even if the trial counsel was not able to exclude the doctor’s expert
opinions, a pre-trial ruling that this was expert testimony would then provide the
justification necessary for the court to appoint an expert gynecologist for the
defense. But as it was, trial counsel apparently relied on the trial court’s
equivocal statements that the doctor was a fact witness and thus was
unprepared to meet the expert opinions with either his own expert or at least an
effective cross-examination that addressed the obvious flaws with the expert
opinions.
Finally, as to this issue, the district court’s basis of dismissal was that
Petitioner made no allegations forming the basis for excluding the testimony. This
is just wrong, as shown above, the petition does exactly explain the problem, the
district court just never addresses it.
Next, while trial counsel did ineffectively object to the expert opinion at
trial, this raises the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing
to appeal the court’s decision to allow the expert testimony.
The district court doesn’t address this issue except to say Petitioner has
not shown that it was a stronger issue than those raised. However, if this was a
meritorious issue then it is necessarily stronger than the ones raised which were
all rejected by the Supreme Court when it affirmed the conviction.
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And Appellant asserts it is a meritorious issue given the district court’s
rulings. While the physician may well have been the victim’s physician, the court
confused the idea of a treating physician being a fact witness with the real
purpose of the witness in our case. The OB-GYN was actually not the treating
physician since there is no evidence that the victim was being treated medically
for anything related to this case. Rather, it was simply her doctor. The victim’s
doctor could no doubt properly testify about various characteristics of the victim
based on the previous examinations. However, the line from treating physician to
non-treating expert was crossed when the doctor identified the victim as being in
the cell phone video and opined about the incidence of various characteristics in
the populace.
Finally, the court’s dismissal of the grounds that trial counsel failed to
bring a motion of acquittal

based on insufficient evidence ignores all the

problems with the identification discussed above.
In short, the OB-GYN had to admit that she could not state that the
victim’s conclusively identifying characteristics were present in the video, to wit,
her tattoo and belly button. The doctor also had to admit that she did not see
the victim’s mole in the video.

Rather, the gynecologist spoke in completely

non-referential and unscientific terms such as common and very uncommon.
Tellingly, she could not give the percentage of young women who have removed
all of their public hair and simply said it was more common than it used to be.
The unchallenged expert opinions of the doctor is also why Petitioner
suffered cognizable prejudice from all of the instances of ineffective assistance

20

of counsel.

There was absolutely no evidence of any connection between the

victim and the Petitioner. This includes the time period two years prior made
relevant by a comment by the attacker. The victim did not pick the Petitioner out
of a visual or a voice lineup.

None of the Petitioner’s DNA was found at the

scene. However, the DNA of a different man was found there.
But the gynecologist’s certain sounding identification of the victim as the
female in the cell phone video allowed the jury to ignore all of the other evidence.
Had the expert opinion been excluded, or ruled on pre-trial and a defense
prepared to the testimony, or the denial of the objection appealed, the outcome
of the case would have been different.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner
respectfully requests that the district court’s order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and vacated and the matter
remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this _____ day of September, 2016.
_____________________
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _____ day of September, 2016, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF by emailing it to the
Idaho Attorney General at ecf@ag.idaho.gov
_________________________
Greg S. Silvey
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